Abstract. Security is constantly been infringed by inadvertent loss of secret keys, and as a solution, Dodis, Katz, Xu, and Yung [11], in Eurocrypt 2002, proposed a new paradigm called key-insulated security which provides tolerance against key exposures. Their scheme introduces a "helper key" which is used to periodically update the decryption key. The most attractive part of this scheme is that even if a decryption key of a time period is exposed, the security of the rest of the periods are unaffected. But how does this helper key managed? Can it be done efficiently? As, to alleviate the damage caused by key exposures, decryption key has to be updated at very short intervals, although frequent updating will, in contrary, increase the risk of helper key exposure. In this paper, we propose parallel key-insulated public key encryption in which two distinct helper keys alternately update a decryption key. The helper key of one system is independent from the other. Not only does it decrease the chance of helper key exposures, it also allows frequent updating of the decryption key, and over all, increases the security of the system.
Introduction
Our Results. In this paper, we propose parallel key-insulated public key encryption (PKIPE). Our PKIPE allows frequent updating of the decryption key, and at the same time, reduces the risk of helper key exposure. PKIPE differs from the original KIPE in that two distinct helper devices are introduced and each device is alternately used to update a single decryption key (so, you don't have to carry your helper device to-and-from work and office each day).
Initialization in PKIPE involves providing two auxiliary helpers H 1 and H 2 with master helper keys mst 1 and mst 2 , respectively, and the user's terminal with a stage 0 user secret key usk 0 . Similarly to the original KIPE, user's public encryption key pk is treated like that of an ordinary encryption scheme with regard to certification, but its lifetime is divided into stages i = 1, 2, ..., N (= 2n) with encryption in stage i performed as a function of pk, i and the plaintext, and decryption in stage i performed by using a stage i user secret key usk i obtained by the following key-update process performed at the beginning of stage i:
-If i = 2k −1 for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, H 1 sends to the user's terminal over a secure channel, a stage i helper key hsk i computed as a function of mst 1 and i, -If i = 2k for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, similarly to the above, H 2 sends hsk i computed as a function of mst 2 and i, the user computes usk i as a function of usk i−1 and hsk i , and erases usk i−1 . Like the original KIPE, our PKIPE also address random access key update [11] in which the user computes an arbitrary stage user secret key (that could also be a past key). The security intentions are:
1. If none of the helpers is compromised, similar to the original KIPE, exposure of any of user secret keys does not compromise the security of the non-exposed stages, and 2. even if one of H 1 and H 2 is compromised in addition to the exposure of any of user secret keys, it still does not compromise the security of the nonexposed stages except for the ones whose corresponding user secret keys can be trivially determined from the exposed keys.
For case 2., consider a situation where an adversary obtains mst 1 , usk i0 and usk i1 such that i 0 and i 1 are even and odd, respectively. Obviously, stages i 0 and i 1 are compromised. The security of stage i 0 + 1 may also be compromised since usk i0+1 is easily computable from usk i0 and mst 1 . Similarly, security of stage i 1 − 1, too, may be compromised. (Notice that we address random access key update and so we can recover past keys). On the other hand, for example, the security of stage i 1 + 1 is not compromised as usk i1+1 is computed as a function of usk i1 and mst 2 , and not mst 1 . So, in this case, security of all stages except for i 0 , i 0 + 1, i 1 and i 1 − 1 remain secure. Furthermore, if only one of H 1 or H 2 is compromised but none of the user secret key is exposed, then all stages remain secure. In other words, even for the case when one of helper keys, mst 1 and mst 2 is exposed, the security of our PKIPE is guaranteed to maintain at least the security level of the original KIPE.
Similar to the original KIPE, we can further address the case when all of the helper keys are exposed:
3. Even if both helpers H 1 and H 2 are compromised, security of all stages remain secure as long as user secret key (of even one stage) is not compromised in addition to the helper keys.
Our proposed schemes are proven to be semantically secure in the random oracle model. Related Works. Followed by the earlier proposal made by Dodis, Katz, Xu and Yung [11] , Dodis, Franklin, Katz, Miyaji and Yung proposed an intrusionresilient public key encryption (IRPKE) [13] which strengthened the forward security of KIPE. The security of IRPKE has enhanced, only, it became less convenient as it did not allow random access key update. There were proposal of signature schemes as well with the same intention to provide tolerance against key exposures: Key-insulated signature [12] and intrusion-resilient signature [17] . On the other hand, as an encryption scheme that allows key update, there is, the KIPE and also, forward secure public key encryption (FSPKE). FSPKE was introduced by Anderson [1] and the first efficient construction was proposed by Canetti, Halevi and Katz [10] . Dodis, Franklin, Katz, Miyaji and Yung showed that by using FSPKE with a homomorphic property, a generic IRPKE can be constructed [14] . Not to mention, many variations of forward secure signatures have also been introduced, e.g. [8, 2] .
Identity-based encryption (IBE) [18, 5, 9] works as a crucial building block in the construction of KIPE. Bellare and Palacio showed in [7] that a KIPE (OT-KIPE)
1 which allows unlimited number of key updating is equivalent to an IBE, and so, constructing a provably secure OT-KIPE in the standard model with [3] , [4] or [19] can be done also. In this paper, we show that [5] is used as a basic building block to construct PKIPE.
Definitions
First, we give the model of PKIPE and the security notion. We follow by showing the characteristics of bilinear maps and a related computational assumption.
Model: Parallel Key-Insulated Public Key Encryption
A PKIPE scheme E consists of five efficient algorithms (KeyGen, ∆-Gen, Update, Encrypt, Decrypt).
KeyGen: Takes a security parameter k and returns mst 1 , mst 2 , usk 0 and pk.
Public key pk includes a description of finite message space M, and description of finite ciphertext space C. ∆-Gen: Takes as inputs, mst j and i, and returns stage i helper key hsk i if j = i mod 2, or ⊥ otherwise. Update: Takes as inputs, usk i−1 , hsk i and i, and returns stage i user secret key usk i . Encrypt: Takes as inputs, pk, i and M ∈ M, and returns ciphertext C ∈ C. Decrypt: Takes as inputs, pk, usk i and C ∈ C, and returns M ∈ M or ⊥.
These algorithms satisfy ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N }, ∀M ∈ M, Decrypt(pk, usk i , C) = M where C = Encrypt(pk, i, M ).
Security Notion
Here, we define the notion of semantic security for PKIPE. This is based on the security definition in the original KIPE [11, 7] . It should be noticed that the definition in [7] looks simpler than in [11] but they are essentially the same.
We say that a PKIPE scheme E is semantically secure against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under an adaptive chosen key exposure attack (IND-KE-CCA) if no polynomially bounded adversary A has a non-negligible advantage against the challenger in the following IND-KE-CCA game:
Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter k and runs the KeyGen algorithm. He gives pk to A and keeps usk 0 , mst 1 and mst 2 to himself. Phase 1: A issues queries q 1 , · · · , q m where each of the queries q i is one of:
-Exposure query j, class : If class = "user", the challenger responds by running the algorithms ∆-Gen and Update to generate usk j and sends it to A. If class = "helper", the challenger sends mst j to A.
-Decryption query j, C : The challenger responds by running the algorithms ∆-Gen and Update to generate usk j . He then runs Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext C using usk j and sends the result to A. These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query q i may depend on the replies to q 1 , · · · , q i−1 . Challenge: Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, she outputs two equal length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 ∈ M and j * ∈ {1, 2, ..., N } on which she wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and sets C * = Encrypt(pk, j * , M β ). The challenger sends C * as the challenge to A. Phase 2: A issues additional queries q m+1 , · · · , q max where each of the queries is one of: -Exposure query j, class : Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
-Decryption query j, C : Challenger responds as in Phase 1. These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase 1. Guess: Finally, A outputs β ∈ {0, 1}. She wins the game if β = β and 1. j * , C * does not appear in Decryption queries, 2. j * , "user" does not appear in Exposure queries, 3. both j * −1, "user" and 2−(j * mod 2), "helper" do not simultaneously appear in Exposure queries, 4. both j * +1, "user" and (j * mod 2)+1, "helper" do not simultaneously appear in Exposure queries, 5. both 1, "helper" and 2, "helper" do not simultaneously appear in Exposure queries.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-KE-CCA adversary. We define A's advantage in attacking the scheme E as Adv E,A = Pr[β = β] − 1/2. The provability is over the random bits used by the challenger and A. As usual, we can define chosen plaintext security similarly to the game above except that the adversary is not allowed to issue any Decryption queries. We call this adversary IND-KE-CPA adversary.
Definition 1
We say that a PKIPE system E is (t, )-adaptive chosen ciphertext secure under adaptive chosen key exposure attacks if for any t-time IND-KE-CCA adversary A, we have Adv E,A < . As shorthand, we say that E is IND-KE-CCA secure. Also, we say that E is (t, )-adaptive chosen plaintext secure under adaptive chosen key exposure attacks if for any t-time IND-KE-CPA adversary A, we have Adv E,A < . As shorthand, we say that E is IND-KE-CPA secure.
IND-KE-CCA is already a strong security notion, but its security can be enhanced further to cover the compromise of both the helper keys. Concretely, as a constraint on the above adversary's Exposure query, we can modify 5. so that:
5 . 1, "helper" , 2, "helper" , and j, "user" do not simultaneously appear in Exposure queries for any j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }.
Such modification allows A to obtain both mst 1 and mst 2 if A doesn't ask any of user secret keys. Let this adversary be a strong IND-KE-CCA adversary. Similarly, we can define strong IND-KE-CPA adversary, and here as well, she is not allowed to issue any Decryption queries.
Definition 2 We say that a PKIPE system E is (t, )-adaptive chosen ciphertext secure under strongly adaptive chosen key exposure attacks if for any t-time strong IND-KE-CCA adversary A, we have Adv E,A < . As shorthand, we say that E is strongly IND-KE-CCA secure. Also, we say that E is (t, )-adaptive chosen plaintext secure under strongly adaptive chosen key exposure attacks if for any t-time strong IND-KE-CPA adversary A, we have Adv E,A < . As shorthand, we say that E is strongly IND-KE-CPA secure.
A Remark. In the discussion we had so far, it may seem like we may have overlooked the exposure of stage i helper key, but actually, we haven't. It is obvious that if hsk i can be computed from usk i−1 and usk i for any stage i, then exposure of hsk i can be emulated by using the responses to the Exposure queries. So, the security definition so far given is sufficient as it is even against exposure of stage i helper keys for any i, if we assume that such property holds. As a matter of fact, all of our constructions satisfy this property.
Bilinear Maps and the CBDH Assumption
Throughout this paper, we let G 1 and G 2 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, and g be a generator of G 1 . A bilinear map e :
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v)
≥ cbdh , where the probability is over the random choice of generator g ∈ G 1 \{1}, and a, b, c ∈ Z q and random coins consumed by A cbdh .
Definition 3
We say that the (t cbdh , cbdh )-CBDH assumption holds in G 1 , G 2 , e if no t cbdh -time algorithm has advantage of at least cbdh in solving the CBDH problem in G 1 , G 2 , e .
Chosen Plaintext Secure Construction
In this section, we propose our PKIPE schemes and prove its security under CBDH assumption in the random oracle model. Intuitively, picture two independent Boneh-Franklin IBEs (BF-IBE) [5, 6] integrated to one another and the master key of one BF-IBE is free to leak. Applying a straightforward 2-out-of-2 threshold key generation of BF-IBE [5] is not the correct answer since then the master keys of both BF-IBEs will be required to update a decryption key. Instead, in our PKIPE schemes, master keys of the two independent BF-IBEs are alternately used to update a single key (so, only one master key is used at a time). Furthermore, interestingly, decryption key size, ciphertext size and computational cost for decryption in our PKIPE remain unchanged (and public key size and encryption cost is increased but only slightly for one element in G 1 and one pairing computation, respectively) as in the original BF-IBE. In our schemes, we let N = O(poly(k)).
Construction
Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups of order q of size k, and g be a generator of G 1 . Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear map. Let G, H be cryptographic hash functions G : G 2 → {0, 1} n for some n, H : {0, 1} * → G 1 , respectively. The message space is M = {0, 1}
n . The PKIPE1 scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1. computes usk i = usk i−1 · hsk i , 2. deletes usk i−1 and hsk i , 3. outputs usk i . Encrypt: For given pk, i and a message M ∈ {0, 1} n , Encrypt algorithm: 1. chooses random r ∈ Z * q , 2. computes u i−1 = H(i − 1) and
. outputs C as a ciphertext. Decrypt: For given pk, usk i and C = i, c 0 , c 1 , Decrypt algorithm:
1. computes W = e(c 0 , usk i ), 2. computes M = c 1 ⊕ G(W ), 3. outputs M as a plaintext.
Security
Now, we prove that PKIPE1 is IND-KE-CPA under the CBDH assumption. For readers who are already familiar with KIPE and/or IBE, here we give an overview of the proof. PKIPE1 is based on [5, 6] , so, a proof technique similar to [5, 6] can be applied. However, there are still some technical hurdles to overcome due to the peculiar key-updating mechanism using two different helper keys. Namely, embedding the given CBDH instance into the responses to the adversary's queries cannot be straightforwardly carried out since the keys are mutually dependent on one another, and that the simulation fails if inconsistency of the responses is noticed by the adversary. For example, suppose that the simulator embeds the given instance into usk α (= d α−1 d α ) for some stage α. Here, the simulator does not know the value of usk α but has to respond to any Exposure queries (except for usk α ) including usk α−1 (= d α−2 d α−1 ) and usk α+1 (= d α d α+1 ). We notice that both factors of usk α , i.e. d α−1 and d α appear in usk α−1 or usk α+1 , and so, responding to usk α−1 and usk α+1 without knowing usk α is not easy. Proof. We show that we can construct an algorithm A cbdh that can solve the CBDH problem in G 1 , G 2 , e by using an adversary A pkipe that breaks IND-KE-CPA security of our scheme. The algorithm A cbdh is given an instance g, g a , g b , g c in G 1 from the challenger and tries to output e(g, g) abc using A pkipe . Let
The algorithm A cbdh works by interacting with A pkipe in an IND-KE-CPA game as follows:
Before starting the simulation, A cbdh flips a coin COIN ∈ {0, 1} such that we have Pr[COIN = 0] = δ for some δ which we will determine later. If COIN = 0, A cbdh simulates the responses to A pkipe 's queries expecting that A pkipe will never submit j, "helper" as Exposure query for any j. If COIN = 1, A cbdh carries out the simulation expecting that A pkipe will submit j, "helper" for some j.
If COIN = 0, A cbdh responses to A pkipe 's queries will be as follows:
Setup: A cbdh picks a random s ∈ Z * q . Also, A cbdh gives A pkipe the system parameter pk = q, G 1 , G 2 , e, n, g, h 1 , h 2 , G, H , where h 1 = g 1 and h 2 = g s 1 , and random oracles G, H are controlled by A cbdh as described below. G-queries: A pkipe issues up to q G queries to the random oracle G. To respond to these queries algorithm, A cbdh forms a list of tuples W, x as explained below. We call this list G list . The list is initially empty. When A pkipe gives A cbdh a query W to the oracle G, A cbdh responds as follows: 1. If the query W already appears on the G list in a tuple W, x , then outputs G(W ) = x. 2. A cbdh chooses a random x ∈ {0, 1} n . 3. A cbdh adds the tuple W, x to the G list and outputs G(W ) = x. H-queries: A cbdh picks a random α ∈ {1, ..., N } in advance. A pkipe issues up to q H queries to the random oracle H. To respond to these queries algorithm, A cbdh forms a list of tuples i, u i , r i as explained below. We call the list H list . The list is initially empty. When A pkipe gives A cbdh a query i to the oracle H, A cbdh responds as follows: 1. If the query i already appears on the H list in a tuple i, u i , r i , then outputs H(i) = u i . Challenge: Once algorithm A pkipe decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target stage i * and two messages M 0 , M 1 on which it wishes to be challenged. Algorithm A cbdh responds as follows:
Guess: When A pkipe decides that Phase 2 is over, A pkipe outputs its guess bit β ∈ {0, 1}. At the same time, algorithm A cbdh terminates the simulation. Then, A cbdh picks a tuple W, x uniformly at random from the G list , and computes T = (
Claim 1 If i * = α and A cbdh does not abort, then A pkipe 's view is identical to its view in the real attack until A pkipe submits W * as a G-query, where
Proof. It is obvious that the responses to G and H are as in the real attack. Interestingly, the responses to Exposure queries are perfect if A cbdh does not abort. Finally, we show that the response to Challenge is indistinguishable from the real attack until A pkipe submits W * . Let the response to Challenge be C * = α, c * 0 , c * 1 . Then, c * 0 is uniformly distributed in G 1 due to random log g g 3 (= c), and therefore are as in the real attack. Also, since c *
, it is information-theoretically impossible to obtain any information on M β unless A pkipe asks G(W * ).
Next, let us define by E 1 , an event assigned to be true if and only if i * = α. Similarly, let us define by E 2 , an event assigned to be true if and only if a Gquery coincides with W * , and by E msk , an event assigned to be true if and only if an Exposure query coincides with i, "helper" for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
Claim 2 We have that
Proof. It is clear that i∈{1,...,N } Pr[β = β|i 
, it is impossible to obtain any information on M β without asking W * as a G-query. 
Claim 4 We have that
and Claim 3, we have 
Next, let us define by E 3 , an event assigned to be true if and only if i * = α. Similarly, let us define by E 4 , an event assigned to be true if and only if a Gquery coincides with W * , by E 5 , an event assigned to be true if and only if an Exposure query coincides with b, "helper" , and by E msk , an event assigned to be true if and only if an Exposure query coincides with i, "helper" for any i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice that E msk is identical to that in the case of COIN = 0.
Claim 6 We have that
Proofs of Claims 5, 6 and 7 are given in the full version of this paper. 
Claim 8 We have that
By letting δ = 1/3, we finally have cbdh ≥ 2 3qGN pkipe . From the above discussions, we can see that the claimed bound of the runningtime of A cbdh holds. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Strongly IND-KE-CPA Scheme
We can build a construction of a strongly IND-KE-CPA scheme PKIPE2 by only slightly modifying PKIPE1. The PKIPE2 consists of the following algorithms:
PKIPE2: Strongly IND-KE-CPA Construction KeyGen: Given a security parameter k, KeyGen algorithm does the same as that of PKIPE1 except that it: 2. picks random, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ∈ Z * q , and sets h 1 = g s1s3 and h 2 = g s2s3 , 6. outputs pk = q, G 1 , G 2 , e, n, g, h 1 , h 2 , G, H , mst 1 = s 1 , mst 2 = s 2 and usk 0 = d 
